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1. Introduction 
 
As part of the G20 countries, Indonesia and Turkey have shown their commitments to the 
OECD/G20 BEPS Project since the very beginning, including The Multilateral Convention to 
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI) 
Project. Along with the other 66 jurisdictions, Indonesia and Turkey signed the MLI on 7 June 
2017 in Paris3. At that time, both countries also submitted their list of Reservations and 
Notifications on Tax Treaties relevant to their implementation of the MLI.  
 
As readers may already know, the MLI enables countries to swiftly modify their bilateral tax 
treaties to implement tax treaty-related BEPS measures4. As a result, countries who sign the MLI 
can adopt the recommendations set out in BEPS Action Plan 2 (Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements), 
Action 6 (Treaty Abuse), Action 7 (Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status) and Action 14 
(Dispute Resolution) without having to renegotiate their existing tax treaties.5 The existence of the 
MLI is not intended to replace the existing tax treaties; rather, to be read alongside tax treaties.6 
The MLI provisions will become effective for a tax treaty only if both countries notify it as a Covered 
Tax Agreement (CTA) in their own MLI’s position and deposit their ratification instruments with 
the OECD Secretariat.  
 
Indonesia and Turkey already have a tax treaty in force which was signed on 25 February 1997 
and effective since 1 January 2001.7 In its MLI’s position as of 7 June 2017, Indonesia included 
its tax treaty with Turkey as one of CTAs and vice versa. Therefore, once both countries have 
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completed all the procedural requirements of the MLI, the MLI provisions will have effect on the 
existing tax treaty. 
 
This article is intended to give a picture for the readers on how the MLI impacts the existing tax 
treaty between Indonesia and Turkey. This article may also serve as a projection on what a 
synthesised text8 might look like even though it has not been published yet by the competent 
authority of either country. This article will first, address the economic background between two 
countries and considerations taken into account when signing the MLI (Section 2). The article 
will then inform the potential date of MLI Application in both countries (Section 3). Both countries’ 
positions on the MLI and how it modifies the existing tax treaty will be discussed in Section 4. 
The authors will then give concluding remarks and future outlook of the implementation of the 
Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty post-MLI (Section 5). 
 
2. Economical Background and Considerations for Signing the MLI 
 
In history, Turkey and Indonesia always have close relations9, even so, the economic potential 
between two countries arising from similar cultural and structural situations can be realized much 
more effectively.  
 
Firstly, both countries are members of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation which was 
established in 1997 with the idea to improve member states’ position in the global economy, 
diversify and create new opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making 
at international level, and improve standards of living.10 The Agreement on Double Taxation 
Avoidance and Agreement on Investment Promotion11 between Turkey and Indonesia were 
concluded during the same period when D-8 was established. 
 
However, neither Turkey nor Indonesia does not have each other within their twenty largest trade 
partners.12 While Turkey’s most exported products to Indonesia were iron, steel, leaf tobacco, 
carpets, Indonesia’s were fiber, rubber, and yarn in the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 as in previous 
years.13 Turkey is in the position of the net importer in the foreign trade between two countries 
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which means the amount of export of Indonesia to Turkey exceeds Turkey’s export. The trade 
balance between the two countries is as follows:14 
 
Turkey-Indonesia Trade15 
Year Export (in thousand US$) Import (in thousand US$) Total (in thousand US$) 
2015 207,001 1,638,245 1,845,246 
2016 253,636 1,424,722 1,678,358 
2017 236,667 1,507,120 1,743,787 
2018 270,000 1,330,000 1,600,000 
 
Turkey and Indonesia have agreed in the meeting in 2017 that trading volume between countries 
will increase 10 billion US$ in a short period.16 Many institutions of countries such as 
TURKCHAM17 and KADIN18 struggle to contribute to economic relations between these two 
countries.19 
 
The tax treaty plays a role here. Although there is no empirical evidence on the effects of a tax 
treaty on trade and bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI)20, the fundamental objective of the tax 
treaty is to facilitate cross-border trade and investment by eliminating double taxation21. Aside 
from that, a tax treaty is also intended to prevent tax evasion and avoidance.22 Although there is 
no real evidence or any dispute involving treaty abuse cases using Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty, 
nevertheless there may be still an urgency to amend tax treaty by adopting some 
recommendations set out in the BEPS Action Plans in order to prevent treaty abuse. This would 
be done by signing the MLI. 
 
Both Indonesia and Turkey have their own consideration to sign the MLI. From Indonesian 
perspective, the decision to sign the MLI has never really been in question. Although the MLI is 
not a minimum standard under the BEPS Project, Indonesia recognized the benefit of 
implementing the MLI, which enables it to modify bilateral tax treaties to implement tax treaty-
related BEPS measures without having a renegotiation process that would take a lot of time.23  
 
 
14
 Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/ (accessed 24 April 2020).  
15
 From Turkish perspective. For the information published by Indonesian Ministry of Trade, can be 
accessed from http://statistik.kemendag.go.id/balance-of-trade-with-trade-partner-country.  
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 Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK), ‘Business Council Report of Meeting in Jakarta’, 
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17
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According to its ratification instrument under Presidential Regulation No. 77 of 2019 (Presidential 
Reg. No.77/2019), Indonesia has selected 47 tax treaties (out of 69 tax treaties) to be included 
as CTAs in the MLI. Those treaties were included based on various reasons, among others, the 
treaty partner is a member of the same regional cooperation or international forums with Indonesia 
(e.g. ASEAN and G20).24 This would be the reason behind the inclusion of the tax treaty with 
Turkey as one of its CTAs in the MLI. 
 
Meanwhile, from the Turkish side, considerations to sign the MLI was to have anti-avoidance rules 
by contributing mutual measures globally without having a renegotiation process. Turkey has 
included all 90 tax treaties as CTAs in the MLI without excluding any tax treaty.  
 
3. Potential Date of the MLI Application in Both Countries 
 
Country who signed the MLI needs to complete all the procedural requirements for the MLI to be 
implemented. The timeline for both countries is as follows: 
 
Step Description Indonesia Turkey 
1 Sign the MLI and submission of country’s initial position on the MLI 7 June 2017 7 June 2017 
2 Ratification of the MLI 12 November 201925 N/A26 
3 Deposit of ratification instrument with the OECD Secretariat27 28 April 2020 N/A 
4 MLI entry into force28 1 August 2020 N/A 
5a MLI entry into effect for Withholding Taxes 
N/A29 N/A 
5b MLI entry into effect for other taxes 
 
As we can see from the above table, both Indonesia and Turkey have not completed all of the 
procedural requirements in order to implement MLI. Even Turkey has not ratified yet. But once it 
is done, the MLI provisions will surely affect the tax treaty between Indonesia and Turkey. 
 
The term “entry into force” differs from the term “entry into effect”. Under Article 34 of the MLI, the 
MLI will enter into force on the first day of the month following a 3-month period from the deposit 
 
24
 Based on an interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Indonesian Fiscal Policy 
Agency on why only selected 47 treaties as CTAs. 
25
 Presidential Regulation No. 77 of 2019. 
26
 As of the date of publication, Turkey’s Revenue Service and OECD Matrix database haven’t expressed 
its ratification date. 
27
 OECD, ‘Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions) as of 30 April 2020’, 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf (accessed 4 May 2020). 
28
 First day of the month following a 3-month period from the deposit. 
29
 Due to Indonesia's position on Article 35(7) of the MLI, Indonesia has to notify the confirmation of the 
completion of its internal procedures to the OECD before the MLI can enter into effect. 
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of the ratification instrument to the OECD Secretariat. “Entry into force” does not necessarily mean 
that the MLI provisions come into effect. “Entry into effect” means the effective date of application 
of the MLI provisions. Under Article 35(1) of the MLI: 
(a) with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, 
where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after the first day of the next 
calendar year that begins on or after the latest of the dates on which this Convention 
enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax Agreement; 
and 
(b) with respect to all other taxes levied by that Contracting Jurisdiction, for taxes levied with 
respect to taxable periods beginning on or after the expiration of a period of six calendar 
months (or a shorter period, if all Contracting Jurisdictions notify the Depositary that they 
intend to apply such shorter period) from the latest of the dates on which this Convention 
enters into force for each of the Contracting Jurisdictions to the Covered Tax Agreement. 
 
Article 35(1) of the MLI serves as the general rule for MLI provisions to enter into effect in a 
contracting state. The wording would be changed if a contracting state made reservations to 
change such wording, for instance, reservations made pursuant to Article 35(2), 35(3), and/or 
35(7) of the MLI. This would be the case of Indonesia, due to its reservations on Article 35(3) and 
35(7)(a) of the MLI. Meanwhile, Turkey adopts the general rule under Article 35(1) without any 
reservations affecting the wording. Consequently, due to their own position on Article 35 of the 
MLI, the MLI provisions (which amending Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty) would enter into effect at 
different times in both countries. 
 
To give an illustration: 
- MLI will enter into force on 1 August 2020 in Indonesia; 
- assuming, Indonesia notifies the completion of internal procedures to the OECD as a 
result of reservation made pursuant to Article 35(7)(a) on 1 April 2021;  
- assuming, MLI would enter into force on 1 May 2021 in Turkey; and 
- therefore, 1 May 202130 would be the date of entry into force of the MLI for tax treaty 
between Indonesia and Turkey.  
 
As a result, in accordance with Article 35(1), Article 35(3) and Article 35(7) of the MLI, the MLI 
provisions have effect with respect to the application of the Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty by 
Indonesia:31 
- with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, 
where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2022; and 
- with respect to all other taxes levied by Indonesia, for taxes levied with respect to taxable 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2022. 
 
 
30
 It should be considered the latter date. 
31
 This conclusion derived from the assumption that Indonesia notifies the completion of internal 
procedures to the OECD as a result of reservation made pursuant to Article 35(7)(a) on 1 April 2021 and 
MLI would enter into force on 1 May 2021 in Turkey. 
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In accordance with Article 35(1) of the MLI, the MLI provisions have effect with respect to the 
application of the Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty by Turkey:32 
- with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, 
where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2022; and 
- with respect to all other taxes levied by Turkey, for taxes levied with respect to taxable 
periods beginning on or after 1 November 2021. 
 
4. Both Countries’ Positions on the MLI and How It Modifies Indonesia-Turkey 
Tax Treaty 
 
For the MLI changes to apply effectively to the Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty, both countries must 
adopt the same provisions (unless an asymmetrical adoption is allowed in particular cases). 
Taking into account the current position of Indonesia33 and Turkey34 on the MLI, the following 
table describes both countries’ position on each of MLI provision and its impact to the Indonesia-
Turkey tax treaty: 
 
Article of 
the MLI Description Indonesia Turkey Result 
3 Transparent Entity 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
3 not to apply. 
Opted in. Does 
not give any 
reservation. 
Article 3 would 
not apply. 
4 Dual Resident Entities 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
4 not to apply to 
Indonesia-Turkey 
tax treaty. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
4 not to apply. 
Article 4 would 
not apply. 
5 
Application of Methods 
for Elimination of Double 
Taxation 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
5 not to apply. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
5 not to apply. 
Article 5 would 
not apply. 
6 Purpose of a Covered Tax Agreement 
Adopted Article 6 
without optional 
text under Article 
6(3). 
Adopted Article 6 
including optional 
text under Article 
6(3). 
The preamble 
text of the tax 
treaty would be 
replaced by the 
text described in 
Article 6(1) of the 
MLI. Article 6(3) 
would not apply. 
7 Prevention of Treaty Abuse 
Adopted PPT 
rule only. 
Adopted PPT 
rule only. 
PPT rule would 
apply. 
 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 As set out in the ratification instrument under Presidential Reg. No.77/2019. 
34
 At the signing of the MLI on 7 June 2017. 
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Article of 
the MLI Description Indonesia Turkey Result 
8 Dividend Transfer Transactions Adopted. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
8 not to apply. 
Article 8 would 
not apply. 
9 
Capital Gains from 
Alienation of Shares or 
Interests of Entities 
Deriving their Value 
Principally from 
Immovable Property 
Adopted with 
Article 9(4) as 
optional 
provision. 
Reservation for 
Article 9(1) not to 
apply. Adopted 
Article 9(4). 
 
Article 9(1) would 
not apply. Article 
9(4) would apply. 
10 
Anti-abuse Rule for PE 
Situated in Third 
Jurisdictions 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
10 not to apply. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
10 not to apply. 
Article 10 would 
not apply. 
11 
Application of Tax 
Agreements to Restrict a 
Party’s Right to Tax its 
Own Residents 
Adopted. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
11 not to apply. 
Article 11 would 
not apply. 
12 
Artificial Avoidance of PE 
Status through 
Commissionaire 
Arrangements and 
Similar Strategies 
Adopted with 
notification 
pursuant to 
Article 12(5) and 
12(6) of the MLI. 
Adopted with 
notification 
pursuant to 
Article 12(5) and 
12(6) of the MLI. 
Article 12(1) and 
12(2) of the MLI 
would apply as 
long as both 
countries notify 
the same 
provision. 
13 
Artificial Avoidance of PE 
Status through the 
Specific Activity 
Exemptions 
Adopted option 
A. 
Adopted option 
A. 
Option A would 
apply with 
respect to Article 
5(4) of the tax 
treaty. Article 
13(4) of the MLI 
would apply to 
Article 5(4) of the 
tax treaty.35 
14 Splitting-up of Contracts Adopted. 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
14 not to apply. 
Article 14 would 
not apply. 
15 
Definition of a Person 
Closely Related to an 
Enterprise 
Opted in. Does 
not give any 
reservation. 
Opted in. Does 
not give any 
reservation. 
Article 15 would 
apply. 
16 Mutual Agreement Procedure 
Adopted with 
some 
notifications. 
Adopted with 
some 
notifications. 
Article 16(1): 
The first 
sentence would 
not apply. The 
second sentence 
would apply. 
 
Article 16(2): 
 
35
 The article 13(4) of the MLI will be inserted as well when adopting Article 13(2): Option A. 
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Article of 
the MLI Description Indonesia Turkey Result 
The first 
sentence would 
not apply. The 
second sentence 
would apply. 
 
Article 16(3): 
The first and 
second sentence 
would not apply. 
17 Corresponding Adjustments 
Adopted with 
notification 
pursuant to Art. 
17(4). 
Reserves the 
right for the 
entirety of Article 
17 not to apply to 
Indonesia-Turkey 
tax treaty. 
Article 17 would 
not apply. 
18-26 Arbitration Does not state position. 
Does not state 
position. 
Arbitration 
provisions would 
not apply. 
 
From the table above, it can be concluded that some of the MLI provisions will affect the existing 
Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty, i.e. Article 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the MLI. The effect of 
notifications depends on the type of compatibility clause which could provide that the MLI 
provision applies “in place of”, “applies to” or “modifies”, “in the absence of”, or “in place of or in 
the absence of”36. The effect aforesaid will be as follows: 
 
(i) Changes to the preamble text of the tax treaty 
The current preamble text of the Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty would be deleted and replaced by 
the text described in Article 6(1) of the MLI. The preamble text will now reads: 
 
“Intending to eliminate double taxation with respect to the taxes covered by this agreement without 
creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance 
(including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this 
agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions),” 
 
(ii) The Inclusion of PPT rule 
PPT rule set out in Article 7(1) of the MLI would apply and supersede the provisions of the tax 
treaty to the extent of the incompatibility. This rule will be the new addition rule to the application 
of Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty. 
 
 
36
 Supra n.5, paras. 15-18. See also: ‘Step-by-Step overview on the application of the MLI’, 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/step-by-step-tool-on-the-application-of-the-MLI.pdf (accessed 26 April 
2020). 
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PPT rule is considered as a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) with a wide scope that denies 
treaty benefits if one of the principal purposes of a transaction or arrangement is to obtain treaty 
benefits.37  
 
(iii) Capital Gains from Alienation of Shares or Interests of Entities Deriving their Value Principally 
from Immovable Property - The Inclusion of Article 9(4) of the MLI 
Article 9(4) of the MLI would apply and supersede the provisions of the tax treaty to the extent of 
the incompatibility. This rule will be the new addition rule to the application of Indonesia-Turkey 
tax treaty. Article 9(4) of the MLI reads: 
 
“For purposes of [this Agreement], gains derived by a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction from 
the alienation of shares or comparable interests, such as interests in a partnership or trust, may 
be taxed in the other Contracting Jurisdiction if, at any time during the 365 days preceding the 
alienation, these shares or comparable interests derived more than 50 per cent of their value 
directly or indirectly from immovable property (real property) situated in that other Contracting 
Jurisdiction.” 
 
(iv) Changes to PE definition 
Article 12 of the MLI addresses the artificial avoidance of PE status through commissionaire 
arrangements and similar strategies. Article 12(1) and 12(2) of the MLI would apply as long as 
both countries notify the same provision. In regards to Article 12(1) of the MLI, there is a 
notification mismatch. Turkey notified Article 5(5) of the tax treaty, while Indonesia notified Article 
5(5)a of the tax treaty. If Turkey changes its notification to Article 5(5)a, then it will be replaced by 
Article 12(1) of the MLI. Meanwhile for Article 12(2) of the MLI, this Article would replace Article 
5(6) of tax treaty.  
 
Article 13 of the MLI addresses situations in which the specific activity exemptions give rise to 
BEPS concerns. Option A as set out under Article 13(2) of the MLI will replace Article 5(4) of 
Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty. In addition to that, the text of Article 13(4) of the MLI will also be 
included. 
 
(v) The Inclusion of Definition of “a Person Closely Related to an Enterprise” 
As a result of the adoption of Article 12 and 13 of the MLI in Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty, the 
definition of “a person closely related to an enterprise” will also be included as set out in Article 
15 of the MLI. This will be inserted to Article 5 of the Turkey-Indonesia tax treaty. 
 
(vi) Effect to MAP Provision 
Indonesia and Turkey already have a mutual agreement procedure (MAP) provision in place 
under Article 24 of the tax treaty. As the result of both countries’ position on Article 16 of the MLI, 
the following sentences will be included in the MAP provision in the treaty without replacing it: 
 
 
37
 Valentyn Kolosov, “Guidance on the Application of the Principal Purpose Test in Tax Treaties”, Bulletin 
for International Taxation, IBFD, February 2017, p. 1. 
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● The second sentence of Article 16(1) of the MLI applies and supersedes the provisions of 
the tax treaty; “The case must be presented within three years from the first notification of 
the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Covered Tax 
Agreement.” and 
● The second sentence of Article 16(2) of the MLI applies to the tax treaty: “Any agreement 
reached shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the 
Contracting Jurisdictions.” 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Future Outlook 
 
Introduction of the MLI marked a new era in international tax law.38 It enables countries to modify 
their bilateral tax treaties to implement tax treaty-related BEPS measures39. Although this article 
only discusses Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty, this article is intended to give a picture for the readers 
on how the MLI impacts the current existing bilateral tax treaty in general. The application of the 
MLI provisions will depend on each country’s position on the MLI. 
 
Countries should also complete all of the procedural requirements in order for the MLI to take 
effect. Both Indonesia and Turkey have not completed all of the procedural requirements. Even 
Turkey’s position on the MLI is not certain yet. Even so, it is likely that Turkey’s position on the 
minimum standards of BEPS Action Plan which will be adopted using the MLI (e.g. preamble text 
and PPT rule) will not be changed. Furthermore, Turkey is going to wait for its ratification to 
prepare synthesised text of the treaty. 
 
From Indonesian perspective, the position on the MLI as set out under Presidential Reg. 
No.77/2019, which deposit of ratification instrument was recently confirmed by the OECD on 28 
April 2020. Indonesian Fiscal Policy Agency as the Competent Authority for the MLI has prepared 
synthesised texts for ‘matching’ CTAs, provided that treaty partners’ position is also definitive (has 
been ratified and submitted to the OECD Secretariat).40 Synthesised texts are expected to be 
published after MLI enters into force through the Indonesian Director General of Taxation (DGT) 
circular letters.41  
 
As seen, Turkey and Indonesia could modify their tax treaty without prolonged renegotiation 
process thanks to the MLI. Therefore, new provisions to be adapted will contribute to preventing 
BEPS concerns, e.g. through treaty shopping. Both countries should also need to revise their 
domestic laws in order to accommodate new features in treaty post-MLI. For instance, until now, 
 
38
 Bartosz Bacia and Patryk Toporowski, “OECD Multilateral Instrument: The New Era in International Tax 
Law”, Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics (2018) 
https://ideas.repec.org/a/srs/jarle0/v9y2018i2p386-395.html, (accessed 27 April 2020). 
39
 Supra n.4. 
40
 Based on an interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Indonesian Fiscal Policy 
Agency on whether synthesised texts have been prepared or not. 
41
 Based on an interview conducted by the author with a representative of the Indonesian Fiscal Policy 
Agency on when the synthesised texts will be published. 
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Turkey and Indonesia do not have GAAR in their domestic tax laws.42 The authors recommend 
that domestic tax law should also include GAAR, besides PPT rule in tax treaty, thereby, it can 
safeguard country from abusive arrangements even if they do not have tax treaties.  
 
While the general objective of tax treaty is to encourage cross-border investment43, one could 
argue that the introduction of PPT rule that contains subjective element could lead to uncertainty44 
and practical difficulties, and as a result, lead to a negative environment for domestic and foreign 
inward investment. Therefore, the general objective of tax treaty will not be achieved and the 
possibility of tax disputes will be increased. 
 
However, as Prof. Judith Freedman indicates that: “a GAAR will not necessarily increase 
uncertainty”.45 It depends on how much certainty exists in a jurisdiction without a GAAR.46 In the 
absence of GAAR, the judges might prolong the interpretation of the wording, whereas if there is 
a carefully formulated GAAR in place they will interpret more narrowly using GAAR as guidance.47 
In this way, a GAAR could actually increase certainty for taxpayers. The authors then propose 
that the introduction of PPT rule as GAAR in tax treaties should also be accompanied by a 
comprehensive set of guidelines for tax authorities and must be administered transparently. 
 
Current and prospective taxpayers or investors for interrelated transactions of both countries 
should consider existing and the new modified version of the treaty when they take action. Also, 
they need to keep up to date with the entry into effect date of the treaty modified with the MLI. 
Both countries’ tax authorities are expected to announce these issues. 
 
On a side note, cross border transactions always bring along tax issues. The authors predict that 
the aim to increase trading volume between two countries which was agreed in 2017 will affect 
trade positively. Thus, tax issues will come to the agenda frequently. In this regard, considering 
the fact that the economy became more globally integrated48, Indonesia-Turkey tax treaty post-
MLI plays an important role.  
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